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Case Digest

Case Digest: HOME BANKERS SAVINGS vs. CA and FAR EAST BANK, G.R. No. 115412 November 19, 1999

Case Digest on

G.R. No. 115412 November 19, 1999 

HOME BANKERS SAVINGS AND TRUST COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and FAR EAST BANK & TRUST CO., INC. respondents. 

Facts

On December 12, 1991, FEBTC submitted the dispute for arbitration before the PCHC Arbitration Committee, 5 under the PCHC’s Supplementary Rules on Regional Clearing to which FEBTC and HBSTC are bound as participants in the regional clearing operations administered by the PCHC.

On January 17, 1992, while the arbitration proceeding was still pending, FEBTC filed an action for sum of money and damages with preliminary attachment.

Issue

Whether or not the respondent can FILE A SEPARATE CASE IN COURT OVER THE SAME SUBJECT MATTER OF ARBITRATION DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF THAT ARBITRATION, SIMPLY TO OBTAIN THE PROVISIONAL REMEDY OF ATTACHMENT AGAINST THE BANK THE ADVERSE PARTY IN THE ARBITRATION PROCEEDING 

Ruling

No.

Under the rules and regulations of the Philippine Clearing House Corporation (PCHC), the mere act of participation of the parties concerned in its operations in effect amounts to a manifestation of agreement by the parties to abide by its rules and regulations. As a consequence of such participation, a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the courts over disputes and controversies which fall under the PCHC Rules and Regulations without first going through the arbitration processes laid out by the body

Clearly therefore, petitioner Associated Bank, by its voluntary participation and its consent to the arbitration rules cannot go directly to the Regional Trial Court when it finds it convenient to do so. The jurisdiction of the PCHC under the rules and regulations is clear, undeniable and is particularly applicable to all the parties in the third party complaint under their obligation to first seek redress of their disputes and grievances with the PCHC before going to the trial court. 

At this point, we emphasize that arbitration, as an alternative method of dispute resolution, is encouraged by this Court. Aside from unclogging judicial dockets, it also hastens solutions especially of commercial disputes. 50 The Court looks with favor upon such amicable arrangement and will only interfere with great reluctance to anticipate or nullify the action of the arbitrator. 

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Case Digest: FIESTA WORLD MALL CORP, vs. LINBERG, G.R. NO. 152471 August 18, 2006

Case Digest: G.R. NO. 152471 August 18, 2006 

FIESTA WORLD MALL CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs.
LINBERG PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent.

Case Digest on Alternative Dispute Resolution

Facts

This is a case involving arbitration where in the respondent, Linberg Philippines ,Inc.,  constructed the power plant in Lipa City at a cost of about P130,000,000.00., and subsequently started billing petitioner, Fiesta World Mall Corpotation. However, petitioner questioned the said amount and refused to pay despite respondent’s repeated demands. 

Respondent filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against petitioner, which the later found it to be premature taking into consideration the arbitration clause as provided in their agreement, to wit: 

If FIESTA WORLD disputes the amount specified by any invoice, it shall pay the undisputed amount on or before such date(s), and the disputed amount shall be resolved by arbitration of three (3) persons, one (1) by mutual choice, while the other two (2) to be each chosen by the parties themselves, within fourteen (14) days after the due date for such invoice and all or any part of the disputed amount paid to LINBERG shall be paid together with interest pursuant to Article XXV from the due date of the invoice. 

Issue

Whether or not the filing with the trial court of respondent’s complaint is premature. 

Ruling

Yes. 

The Contract, quoted earlier, mandates that should petitioner dispute any amount of energy fees in the invoice and billings made by respondent, the same “shall be resolved by arbitration of three (3) persons, one (1) by mutual choice, while the other two (2) to be each chosen by the parties themselves.” The parties, in incorporating such agreement in their Contract, expressly intended that the said matter in dispute must first be resolved by an arbitration panel before it reaches the court. They made such arbitration mandatory. 

It should be noted that in this jurisdiction, arbitration has been held valid and constitutional. And to brush aside such agreement providing for arbitration in case of disputes between the parties would be a step backward 

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Case Digest

Case Digest: Magellan Capital vs. Rolando Soza, G.R. No. 129916

MAGELLAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT CORPORATION vs. ROLANDO M. ZOSA , et. al

G.R. No. 129916            March 26, 2001

Facts:

This is a case of involving the validity of arbitration clause as provided in the “Employment Agreement” among Magellan Capital Holdings Corporation 

[MCHC], Magellan Capital Management Corporation [MCMC] and Rolando M. Zosa designating Zosa as President and Chief Executive Officer of MCHC. 

The Arbitration Clause provides in portion, “Arbitration shall be effected by a panel of three arbitrators. The Manager, Employee and Corporation shall designate one (1) arbitrator who shall, in turn, nominate and elect who among them shall be the chairman of the committee. 

Facts:

Whether the arbitration clause is valid and binding. 

Ruling

No. 

From the foregoing arbitration clause, it appears that the two (2) defendants [petitioners] (MCMC and MCHC) have one (1) arbitrator each to compose the panel of three (3) arbitrators. As the defendant MCMC is the Manager of defendant MCHC, its decision or vote in the arbitration proceeding would naturally and certainly be in favor of its employer and the defendant MCHC would have to protect and preserve its own interest; hence, the two (2) votes of both defendants (MCMC and MCHC) would certainly be against the lone arbitrator for the plaintiff [herein defendant]. 

We need only to emphasize in closing that arbitration proceedings are designed to level the playing field among the parties in pursuit of a mutually acceptable solution to their conflicting claims. Any arrangement or scheme that would give undue advantage to a party in the negotiating table is anathema to the very purpose of arbitration and should, therefore, be resisted. 

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Case Digest: ARSENIO A. AGUSTIN VS. COMELEC G.R. No. 207105, November 10, 2015

ARSENIO A. AGUSTIN, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND SALVADOR S. PILLOS, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 207105, EN BANC, November 10, 2015, BERSAMIN, J.] 

FACTS: 

In 1997, petitioner Agustin was naturalized as a citizen of the United States of America (USA). 

In 2012, he filed his certificate of candidacy (CoC) for the position of Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte to be contested in the May 2013 local elections. As the official candidate of the Nacionalista Party, he declared in his CoC that he was eligible for the office he was seeking to be elected to; that he was a natural-born Filipino citizen; and that he had been a resident of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte for 25 years. 

Respondent Salvador S. Pillos, a rival mayoralty candidate, filed in the COMELEC a Petition To Deny Due Course and/or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Arsenio A. Agustin, alleging that the petitioner had made a material misrepresentation in his CoC by stating that he had been a resident of the Municipality of Marcos for 25 years despite having registered as a voter therein only on May 31, 2012. 

In his answer, the petitioner countered that the one-year requirement referred to residency, not to voter registration; that residency was not dependent on citizenship, such that his travel to Hawaii for business purposes did not violate the residency requirement pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence; and that as regards citizenship, he attached a copy of his Affidavit of Renunciation of U.S. American Citizenship. 

The COMELEC Second Division issued its omnibus resolution holding that the requirement that a candidate must be a registered voter does not carry with it the requirement that he must be so one year before the elections because this refers to the residency qualification. 

As far as registration as a voter is concerned, it should suffice that they are duly registered upon the filing of their COCs or within the period prescribed by law for such registration. 

Pillos moved for the reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc. He alleged that the certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration reflected that the petitioner had voluntarily declared in his travel documents that he was a citizen of the USA; that when he travelled to Hawaii, USA on October 6, 2012, he still used his USA passport despite his renunciation of his USA citizenship on October 2, 2012 and after filing his CoC on October 5, 2012, in which he declared that he was a resident of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte; and that the petitioner’s declaration of his eligibility in his CoC constituted material misrepresentation because of his failure to meet the citizenship and residency requirements. 

On April 23, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued its assailed resolution cancelling and denying due course to the petitioner’s CoC, observing that while Agustin presented a copy of his Affidavit of Renunciation, he failed to furnish this Commission a copy of his Oath of Allegiance. 

Noteworthy is the fact, that in Agustin’s Affidavit of Renunciation, it was stated that his Oath of Allegiance is attached; however, said attachment has not been made available for the perusal of this Commission. Having failed to sufficiently show that he complied with the provisions of RA 9225, Agustin’s COC must be cancelled and/or denied due course. 

On election day, the name of the petitioner remained in the ballot. He was later on proclaimed as the duly elected Municipal Mayor of Marcos, Ilocos Norte, the highest among the contending parties. 

The petitioner filed on an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Verified Urgent Motion for Reconsideration with Leave of Court. The petitioner then instituted this case, alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the COMELEC En Banc. 

ISSUE: 

1st issue: Whether or not petitioner Agustin is eligible as a candidate for the position of Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte.  (NO)

2nd issue: Whether or not Pillos’ claim that he is the rightful occupant of the contested elective position correct. (YES)

RULING: 

1st issue: 

No. Petitioner Agustin is not eligible as a candidate for the position of Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte. 

The petitioner filed a valid CoC, but the use of his USA passport after his renunciation of foreign citizenship rendered him disqualified from continuing as a mayoralty candidate. 

There are two remedies available under existing laws to prevent a candidate from running in an electoral race. One is by petition for disqualification, and the other by petition to deny due course to or to cancel his certificate of candidacy. 

A petition for disqualification can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of the OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC. 

On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false. The petitions also have different effects. 

While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC. 

Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. 

If the candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate. 

The petition of Pillos was in the nature of the Section 78 petition to deny due course to or to cancel the CoC of the Yet, the COMELEC En Banc canceled the petitioner’s CoC not because of his failure to meet the residency requirement but because of his failure “to sufficiently show that he complied with the provisions of RA 9225.” Such basis for cancellation was unwarranted considering that he became eligible to run for public office when he expressly renounced his USA citizenship, by which he fully complied with the requirements stated in Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225. His CoC was valid for all intents and purposes of the election laws because he did not make therein any material misrepresentation of his eligibility to run as Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte. 

The Court uphold the declaration by the COMELEC En Banc that the petitioner was ineligible to run and be voted for as Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte. It is not disputed that on October 6, 2012, after having renounced his USA citizenship and having already filed his CoC, he travelled abroad using his USA passport, thereby representing himself as a citizen of the USA. He continued using his USA passport in his subsequent travels abroad despite having been already issued his Philippine passport on August 23, 2012. He thereby effectively repudiated his oath of renunciation on October 6, 2012, the first time he used his USA passport after renouncing his USA citizenship on October 2, 2012. Consequently, he could be considered an exclusively Filipino citizen only for the four days from October 2, 2012 until October 6, 2012. 

The petitioner’s continued exercise of his rights as a citizen of the USA through using his USA passport after the renunciation of his USA citizenship reverted him to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion disqualified him from being elected to public office in the Philippines pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code. 

2nd issue: 

Yes. Pillos’ claim that he is the rightful occupant of the contested elective position is correct. 

Petitioner was declared disqualified by final judgment before election day; hence, the votes cast for him should not be counted. His rival, respondent Pillos, should be proclaimed duly elected Mayor for obtaining the highest number of votes in the elections. 

The effect of the petitioner’s disqualification under the April 23, 2013 resolution depended on when the disqualification attained finality. The distinction exists because of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646 (The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987), which states: 

Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. 

Section 6 of the said law covers two situations. The first is when the disqualification becomes final before the elections, which is the situation covered in the first sentence of Section 6. The second is when the disqualification becomes final after the elections, which is the situation covered in the second sentence of Section 6. 

The present case falls under the first situation. Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law governing the first situation is categorical: a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. 

The effect was to render the votes cast in his favor stray, resulting in Pillos being proclaimed the winning candidate. 

It is crucial, therefore, to determine with certainty the time when the judgment declaring the petitioner disqualified from running for the local elective position attained finality. 

Pillos submits that the April 23, 2013 resolution was already deemed final and executory as of May 4, 2013; hence, the writ of execution was issued on June 18, 2013; and that the petitioner’s disqualification thus attained finality prior to the May 13, 2013 elections. 

Pillos’ submission is correct. Although the petitioner filed his Verified Urgent Motion for Reconsideration with Leave of Court, the April 23, 2013 resolution granting Pillos’ motion for reconsideration, such filing did not impede the April 23, 2013 resolution from being deemed final and executory because Section 1(d), Rule 13 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure expressly disallowed the filing of the motion for reconsideration.

Within the context of Section 13, Rule 18, and Section 3, Rule 37, both of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the April 23, 2013 resolution became final and executory as of May 4, 2013 upon the lapse of five days from its promulgation without a restraining order being issued by the Supreme Court. 

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CASE DIGEST: ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 190582, EN BANC, April 8, 2010

CASE DIGEST: ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 190582, EN BANC, April 8, 2010

FACTS:

“Ang Ladlad” is an organization of people who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals or trans- genders. The Comelec dismissed the petition on moral grounds as “the definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that it tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not “Ang Ladlad” party-list application should be denied as the organizationallegedly tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs.

RULING:

No. The denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion; including its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines’ international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.

Rather than relying on religious belief, the government must act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects. “Ang Ladlad” has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Hence, its application as a party-list should be granted.

CASE DIGEST | SUPREME COURT | PHILIPPINES | CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

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CASE DIGEST: ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007

CASE DIGEST: ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007

FACTS:

Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name  to “Mely” and sex (gender) in his birth certificate be changed to female since he underwent sex reassignment surgery. The OSG alleges that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the live birth certificate by reason of sex reassignment surgery.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a person may successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the live birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery.

RULING:

No. It is the statutes that defines who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. Presently, there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.

The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary. A law has to be enacted by the legislative body laying down the guidelines governing the change of entries in birth certificate due to sex reassignment in order to enter the same in civil registry.

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CASE DIGEST: KILUSANG MAYO UNO vs. THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NEDA, G.R. No. 167798, APRIL 19, 2006

CASE DIGEST: KILUSANG MAYO UNO vs. THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NEDA, G.R. No. 167798, APRIL 19, 2006

FACTS:

President Arroyo issued EO 420 directing a unified ID system among the various government agencies and GOCCs for the purpose of having a uniform ID for all government agencies. Kilusang Mayo Uno and others assailed this EO for being a “usurpation of legislative powers by the president” and it infringes the citizens’ right to privacy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not

EO 420 on Unified  ID System among government agencies infringes on the citizens right to privacy.

(Executive Order 420 of April 13, 2005 was issued for the adoption of a unified multi-purpose identification (ID) system for the government)

RULING:

No. All these years, the GSIS, SSS, LTO, Philhealth and other government entities have been issuing ID cards in the performance of their governmental functions. There have been no complaints from citizens that the ID cards of these government entities violate their right to privacy, and in the collection and recording of personal identification data.

Moreover, EO 420 applies only to government entities that already maintain ID systems and issue ID cards pursuant to their regular functions under existing laws. EO 420 does not grant such government entities any power that they do not already possess under existing laws.

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Case Digest: KNIGHTS OF RIZAL vs. DMCI HOMES, INC

Case Digest:

KNIGHTS OF RIZAL vs. DMCI HOMES, INC., et.al.

G.R. No. 213948 EN BANC, April 18, 2017

FACTS:

A Resolution was issued to temporarily suspend the building permit of DMCI-PDI, citing that the Torre de Manila Condo will rise up high above the back of the national monument, to clearly dwarf the statue of our hero, Jose Rizal, and would certainly ruin the line of sight of the Rizal Shrine from the frontal Roxas Boulevard vantage point.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court can issue a writ of mandamus to stop the construction of DMCI-PDI’s Torre de Manila project.

(A writ of mandamus is an order from a court to an inferior government official ordering the government official to properly fulfill their official duties or correct an abuse of discretion.)

RULING:

No. There is no law prohibiting the construction of the Torre de Manila. The Court has allowed or upheld actions that were not expressly prohibited by statutes when it determined that these acts were not contrary to morals, customs, and public order, or that upholding the same would lead to a more equitable solution to the controversy. 

There is no allegation or proof that the Torre de Manila project is “contrary to morals, customs, and public order” or that it brings harm, danger, or hazard to the community. There is no law prohibiting the construction of the Torre de Manila due to its effect on the background “view, vista, sightline, or setting” of the Rizal Monument.

Case Digest | Supreme Court | Philippines | Constitutional Law