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LSB Encourage Life Blog

#LSBencourage Story 3

#LSBencourage #truestory3

Twice a flunker, now a bar passer!

2017:

Nagenrol ako sa isang review center sa Manila pero less than two months before the Bar namatay ang Papa ko due to cardiac arrest kaya umuwi ako sa amin. Sobrang depressed ko noon at parang nawala lahat ng nireview ko pero naglakas loob pa rin akong bumalik sa Manila noong bar exam month. Hindi ako pumasa.

2018:

Nagdecide akong magself-review at magtake ulit kahit na hindi pa ako totally healed emotionally and mentally dahil sa biglang pagkawala ng Papa ko. Hindi pa rin ako pumasa.

2019:

Nagenrol ako sa isang review center sa Baguio pero twice lang ako umattend. Hindi ako makapag-focus dahil di ko matiis ang electrifying pain sa kaliwang pisngi ko. Thrice na din akong nagka-seizure kaya umuwi na lang ako sa lugar ng mister ko at doon ako nagself-review.

Trigeminal Neuralgia po ang diagnosis nila sa akin and I was taking anti-epileptic medications that time which made me drowsy all the time.

April 29, 2020: Pinagbigyan na din ako ni Lord.

“NAKAKATAKOT BUMAGSAK PERO MAS NAKAKATAKOT SUMUKO…”

  • twice a flunker, now a Bar passer

———

Welcome to the story feature of “Law School Buddy: ENCOURAGE” where we share some of the most inspiring, encouraging, and heartwarming stories of our friends inside and outside of law school. 

Be part of LSB: Encourage by sending your stories through private messages on Facebook, Instagram, or Twitter. You can also send us an email at admin@lawschoolbuddy.info

We look forward to sharing your stories to everyone here at Law School Buddy! 

See other stories here:

https://lawschoolbuddy.info/lsbencourage

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Life Blog LSB Encourage

#LSBencourage Story 2

#LSBencourage #truestory2

Welcome to the second story feature of “Law School Buddy: ENCOURAGE” where we share some of the most inspiring, encouraging, and heartwarming stories of our friends inside and outside of law school. Here’s the story of someone who failed the #Bar2019 exams but promises herself to never give up.

———-

Never give up Never surrender!

April 29, 2020, I can say na ito yung pinakamalungkot na araw in my 30 years of existence! I failed the Bar exam! On April 28,2020, my daughter who is only 6 years old asked, mama attorney ka na bukas? I just smiled and silently prayed na please Lord gawin mo akong abogada bukas. Here comes, April 29,2020 wala akong pangalan sa list of new lawyers.

Sobrang lungkot and sakit yung naramdaman ko. Gusto kong magwala pero diko magawa.  Naupo lang ako and silently asking God WHY? Ginawa ko naman lahat, sinusunod naman kita? Bigla na lang tumakbo  papunta sa akin yung 2 years old niece ko na naglalaro and niyakap ako ng mahigpit, medyo gumaan pakiramdam ko that time pero masakit pa din loob ko. Nagtampo talaga ako kay Lord.

Habang pinipigilan kong umiyak, sabi ko sa anak ko and 4 years old pamangkin, hindi ako pumasa. Umiyak silang dalawa pero mas grabe iyak ng pamangkin ko so i need to comfort her. Yung feeling na kailangan mo ng comfort pero you need to comfort others. Di ko na maalala kung paano ko kinaya yun. 

Earier today, parang bumalik yung feeling na sobrang down ko, sabi ko bakit kaya? Wala naman akong pinagdadaanan. Tapos nakita ko shared memories ng mga kakilala kong pumasa sa bar. Kaya pala!! Sana tuluyan na akong makapag move on! Sana bumalik yung sipag ko para makapag Bar na din next year!! Bumagsak ako pero papasa tayo! Sama ko self ko, gusto ko talagang maging abogada!

Non Desistas Non Exieris!

-probinsyana, bumagsak pero papasa.

———-

Be part of LSB: Encourage by sending your stories through private messages on Facebook, Instagram, or Twitter. You can also send us an email at admin@lawschoolbuddy.info

We look forward to sharing your stories to everyone here at Law School Buddy! 

SEE OTHER STORIES HERE: https://lawschoolbuddy.info/lsbencourage

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LSB Encourage Life Blog

#LSBencourage Story 1

#LSBencourage #truestory1

Welcome to the first story feature of “Law School Buddy: ENCOURAGE” where we share some of the most inspiring, encouraging, and heartwarming stories of our friends inside and outside of law school. Here’s the story of Dio and his dream of becoming a lawyer.

I’m a grade 10 student and from nursery leading up to this month I have always wanted to be a dentist. But when the time came where my peers asked me what strand I was going to take, I chose ABM over the expected choice which was STEM.

It was quite a hard decision to make since throughout my life I was always expected to be a dentist, that is what I also thought to myself throughout my life.

However, I had no talent or pure skill in drawing or aesthetics. Instead, I was quite competent in linguistics and speeches. I pictured alternate versions of myself pursuing different careers. Sadly, I couldn’t see a future where I would become a very competent and successful dentist.

The only thing I saw was me speaking in front of a jury where I prattled on about a case. The career that I envisioned was law.

This realization ultimately helped me make my choice to choose ABM over STEM since I want to take BS in Accountancy as a preparatory course for law.

Hopefully, I have made the right decision and I will do my best to achieve this dream of mine.

Godbless and take care for everyone pursuing the things they want most in life! – Dio

Originally published as a comment in LSB YouTube Channel, April 2021

Be part of LSB: Encourage by sending your stories through private messages on Facebook, Instagram, or Twitter. You can also send us an email at admin@lawschoolbuddy.info.

We look forward to sharing your stories to everyone here at Law School Buddy!

SEE OTHER STORIES HERE: https://lawschoolbuddy.info/lsbencourage

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Case Digest

Case Digest: HOME BANKERS SAVINGS vs. CA and FAR EAST BANK, G.R. No. 115412 November 19, 1999

Case Digest on

G.R. No. 115412 November 19, 1999 

HOME BANKERS SAVINGS AND TRUST COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and FAR EAST BANK & TRUST CO., INC. respondents. 

Facts

On December 12, 1991, FEBTC submitted the dispute for arbitration before the PCHC Arbitration Committee, 5 under the PCHC’s Supplementary Rules on Regional Clearing to which FEBTC and HBSTC are bound as participants in the regional clearing operations administered by the PCHC.

On January 17, 1992, while the arbitration proceeding was still pending, FEBTC filed an action for sum of money and damages with preliminary attachment.

Issue

Whether or not the respondent can FILE A SEPARATE CASE IN COURT OVER THE SAME SUBJECT MATTER OF ARBITRATION DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF THAT ARBITRATION, SIMPLY TO OBTAIN THE PROVISIONAL REMEDY OF ATTACHMENT AGAINST THE BANK THE ADVERSE PARTY IN THE ARBITRATION PROCEEDING 

Ruling

No.

Under the rules and regulations of the Philippine Clearing House Corporation (PCHC), the mere act of participation of the parties concerned in its operations in effect amounts to a manifestation of agreement by the parties to abide by its rules and regulations. As a consequence of such participation, a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the courts over disputes and controversies which fall under the PCHC Rules and Regulations without first going through the arbitration processes laid out by the body

Clearly therefore, petitioner Associated Bank, by its voluntary participation and its consent to the arbitration rules cannot go directly to the Regional Trial Court when it finds it convenient to do so. The jurisdiction of the PCHC under the rules and regulations is clear, undeniable and is particularly applicable to all the parties in the third party complaint under their obligation to first seek redress of their disputes and grievances with the PCHC before going to the trial court. 

At this point, we emphasize that arbitration, as an alternative method of dispute resolution, is encouraged by this Court. Aside from unclogging judicial dockets, it also hastens solutions especially of commercial disputes. 50 The Court looks with favor upon such amicable arrangement and will only interfere with great reluctance to anticipate or nullify the action of the arbitrator. 

See complete list here: LSB Case Digest

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Case Digest

Case Digest: FIESTA WORLD MALL CORP, vs. LINBERG, G.R. NO. 152471 August 18, 2006

Case Digest: G.R. NO. 152471 August 18, 2006 

FIESTA WORLD MALL CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs.
LINBERG PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent.

Case Digest on Alternative Dispute Resolution

Facts

This is a case involving arbitration where in the respondent, Linberg Philippines ,Inc.,  constructed the power plant in Lipa City at a cost of about P130,000,000.00., and subsequently started billing petitioner, Fiesta World Mall Corpotation. However, petitioner questioned the said amount and refused to pay despite respondent’s repeated demands. 

Respondent filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against petitioner, which the later found it to be premature taking into consideration the arbitration clause as provided in their agreement, to wit: 

If FIESTA WORLD disputes the amount specified by any invoice, it shall pay the undisputed amount on or before such date(s), and the disputed amount shall be resolved by arbitration of three (3) persons, one (1) by mutual choice, while the other two (2) to be each chosen by the parties themselves, within fourteen (14) days after the due date for such invoice and all or any part of the disputed amount paid to LINBERG shall be paid together with interest pursuant to Article XXV from the due date of the invoice. 

Issue

Whether or not the filing with the trial court of respondent’s complaint is premature. 

Ruling

Yes. 

The Contract, quoted earlier, mandates that should petitioner dispute any amount of energy fees in the invoice and billings made by respondent, the same “shall be resolved by arbitration of three (3) persons, one (1) by mutual choice, while the other two (2) to be each chosen by the parties themselves.” The parties, in incorporating such agreement in their Contract, expressly intended that the said matter in dispute must first be resolved by an arbitration panel before it reaches the court. They made such arbitration mandatory. 

It should be noted that in this jurisdiction, arbitration has been held valid and constitutional. And to brush aside such agreement providing for arbitration in case of disputes between the parties would be a step backward 

See complete list of Case Digest here: Law School Buddy Case Digest

 

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Case Digest

Case Digest: Magellan Capital vs. Rolando Soza, G.R. No. 129916

MAGELLAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT CORPORATION vs. ROLANDO M. ZOSA , et. al

G.R. No. 129916            March 26, 2001

Facts:

This is a case of involving the validity of arbitration clause as provided in the “Employment Agreement” among Magellan Capital Holdings Corporation 

[MCHC], Magellan Capital Management Corporation [MCMC] and Rolando M. Zosa designating Zosa as President and Chief Executive Officer of MCHC. 

The Arbitration Clause provides in portion, “Arbitration shall be effected by a panel of three arbitrators. The Manager, Employee and Corporation shall designate one (1) arbitrator who shall, in turn, nominate and elect who among them shall be the chairman of the committee. 

Facts:

Whether the arbitration clause is valid and binding. 

Ruling

No. 

From the foregoing arbitration clause, it appears that the two (2) defendants [petitioners] (MCMC and MCHC) have one (1) arbitrator each to compose the panel of three (3) arbitrators. As the defendant MCMC is the Manager of defendant MCHC, its decision or vote in the arbitration proceeding would naturally and certainly be in favor of its employer and the defendant MCHC would have to protect and preserve its own interest; hence, the two (2) votes of both defendants (MCMC and MCHC) would certainly be against the lone arbitrator for the plaintiff [herein defendant]. 

We need only to emphasize in closing that arbitration proceedings are designed to level the playing field among the parties in pursuit of a mutually acceptable solution to their conflicting claims. Any arrangement or scheme that would give undue advantage to a party in the negotiating table is anathema to the very purpose of arbitration and should, therefore, be resisted. 

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Jurisprudence

Philippine Election: Qualifications of National and Local Candidates

Here are the Qualifications of National and Local Candidates in Philippine Elections

I. National level

A. For President and Vice-President 

  1. Natural-born citizen
  2. At least 40 years old on the day of the election
  3. Able to read and write
  4. Registered voter; and 
  5. Resident of the Philippines for at least 10 years
    immediately preceding the day of the election

B. For Senator 

  1. Natural-born citizen;
  2. At least 35 years old on the day of the election;
  3. Able to read and write;
  4. Registered voter; and
  5. Resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election 

II. Local Level

A. For District Representatives 

  1. Natural-born citizen;
  2. Registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected;
  3. Resident of the same district for a period not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election;
  4. Able to read and write; and
  5. At least 25 years old on the day of the election

B. For Governor, Vice Governor, Mayor, Vice-Mayor, Punong Barangay and Sangguniang Members 

  1. Citizen of the Philippines; 
  2. Registered voter in the barangay, municipality,
    city, or province or, in the case of a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod, or Sangguniang Bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; 
  3. Resident therein for at least one year immediately preceding the day of the election; 
  4. Able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect
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Case Digest

Case Digest: ARSENIO A. AGUSTIN VS. COMELEC G.R. No. 207105, November 10, 2015

ARSENIO A. AGUSTIN, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND SALVADOR S. PILLOS, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 207105, EN BANC, November 10, 2015, BERSAMIN, J.] 

FACTS: 

In 1997, petitioner Agustin was naturalized as a citizen of the United States of America (USA). 

In 2012, he filed his certificate of candidacy (CoC) for the position of Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte to be contested in the May 2013 local elections. As the official candidate of the Nacionalista Party, he declared in his CoC that he was eligible for the office he was seeking to be elected to; that he was a natural-born Filipino citizen; and that he had been a resident of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte for 25 years. 

Respondent Salvador S. Pillos, a rival mayoralty candidate, filed in the COMELEC a Petition To Deny Due Course and/or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Arsenio A. Agustin, alleging that the petitioner had made a material misrepresentation in his CoC by stating that he had been a resident of the Municipality of Marcos for 25 years despite having registered as a voter therein only on May 31, 2012. 

In his answer, the petitioner countered that the one-year requirement referred to residency, not to voter registration; that residency was not dependent on citizenship, such that his travel to Hawaii for business purposes did not violate the residency requirement pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence; and that as regards citizenship, he attached a copy of his Affidavit of Renunciation of U.S. American Citizenship. 

The COMELEC Second Division issued its omnibus resolution holding that the requirement that a candidate must be a registered voter does not carry with it the requirement that he must be so one year before the elections because this refers to the residency qualification. 

As far as registration as a voter is concerned, it should suffice that they are duly registered upon the filing of their COCs or within the period prescribed by law for such registration. 

Pillos moved for the reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc. He alleged that the certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration reflected that the petitioner had voluntarily declared in his travel documents that he was a citizen of the USA; that when he travelled to Hawaii, USA on October 6, 2012, he still used his USA passport despite his renunciation of his USA citizenship on October 2, 2012 and after filing his CoC on October 5, 2012, in which he declared that he was a resident of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte; and that the petitioner’s declaration of his eligibility in his CoC constituted material misrepresentation because of his failure to meet the citizenship and residency requirements. 

On April 23, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued its assailed resolution cancelling and denying due course to the petitioner’s CoC, observing that while Agustin presented a copy of his Affidavit of Renunciation, he failed to furnish this Commission a copy of his Oath of Allegiance. 

Noteworthy is the fact, that in Agustin’s Affidavit of Renunciation, it was stated that his Oath of Allegiance is attached; however, said attachment has not been made available for the perusal of this Commission. Having failed to sufficiently show that he complied with the provisions of RA 9225, Agustin’s COC must be cancelled and/or denied due course. 

On election day, the name of the petitioner remained in the ballot. He was later on proclaimed as the duly elected Municipal Mayor of Marcos, Ilocos Norte, the highest among the contending parties. 

The petitioner filed on an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Verified Urgent Motion for Reconsideration with Leave of Court. The petitioner then instituted this case, alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the COMELEC En Banc. 

ISSUE: 

1st issue: Whether or not petitioner Agustin is eligible as a candidate for the position of Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte.  (NO)

2nd issue: Whether or not Pillos’ claim that he is the rightful occupant of the contested elective position correct. (YES)

RULING: 

1st issue: 

No. Petitioner Agustin is not eligible as a candidate for the position of Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte. 

The petitioner filed a valid CoC, but the use of his USA passport after his renunciation of foreign citizenship rendered him disqualified from continuing as a mayoralty candidate. 

There are two remedies available under existing laws to prevent a candidate from running in an electoral race. One is by petition for disqualification, and the other by petition to deny due course to or to cancel his certificate of candidacy. 

A petition for disqualification can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of the OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC. 

On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false. The petitions also have different effects. 

While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC. 

Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. 

If the candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate. 

The petition of Pillos was in the nature of the Section 78 petition to deny due course to or to cancel the CoC of the Yet, the COMELEC En Banc canceled the petitioner’s CoC not because of his failure to meet the residency requirement but because of his failure “to sufficiently show that he complied with the provisions of RA 9225.” Such basis for cancellation was unwarranted considering that he became eligible to run for public office when he expressly renounced his USA citizenship, by which he fully complied with the requirements stated in Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225. His CoC was valid for all intents and purposes of the election laws because he did not make therein any material misrepresentation of his eligibility to run as Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte. 

The Court uphold the declaration by the COMELEC En Banc that the petitioner was ineligible to run and be voted for as Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte. It is not disputed that on October 6, 2012, after having renounced his USA citizenship and having already filed his CoC, he travelled abroad using his USA passport, thereby representing himself as a citizen of the USA. He continued using his USA passport in his subsequent travels abroad despite having been already issued his Philippine passport on August 23, 2012. He thereby effectively repudiated his oath of renunciation on October 6, 2012, the first time he used his USA passport after renouncing his USA citizenship on October 2, 2012. Consequently, he could be considered an exclusively Filipino citizen only for the four days from October 2, 2012 until October 6, 2012. 

The petitioner’s continued exercise of his rights as a citizen of the USA through using his USA passport after the renunciation of his USA citizenship reverted him to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion disqualified him from being elected to public office in the Philippines pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code. 

2nd issue: 

Yes. Pillos’ claim that he is the rightful occupant of the contested elective position is correct. 

Petitioner was declared disqualified by final judgment before election day; hence, the votes cast for him should not be counted. His rival, respondent Pillos, should be proclaimed duly elected Mayor for obtaining the highest number of votes in the elections. 

The effect of the petitioner’s disqualification under the April 23, 2013 resolution depended on when the disqualification attained finality. The distinction exists because of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646 (The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987), which states: 

Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. 

Section 6 of the said law covers two situations. The first is when the disqualification becomes final before the elections, which is the situation covered in the first sentence of Section 6. The second is when the disqualification becomes final after the elections, which is the situation covered in the second sentence of Section 6. 

The present case falls under the first situation. Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law governing the first situation is categorical: a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. 

The effect was to render the votes cast in his favor stray, resulting in Pillos being proclaimed the winning candidate. 

It is crucial, therefore, to determine with certainty the time when the judgment declaring the petitioner disqualified from running for the local elective position attained finality. 

Pillos submits that the April 23, 2013 resolution was already deemed final and executory as of May 4, 2013; hence, the writ of execution was issued on June 18, 2013; and that the petitioner’s disqualification thus attained finality prior to the May 13, 2013 elections. 

Pillos’ submission is correct. Although the petitioner filed his Verified Urgent Motion for Reconsideration with Leave of Court, the April 23, 2013 resolution granting Pillos’ motion for reconsideration, such filing did not impede the April 23, 2013 resolution from being deemed final and executory because Section 1(d), Rule 13 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure expressly disallowed the filing of the motion for reconsideration.

Within the context of Section 13, Rule 18, and Section 3, Rule 37, both of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the April 23, 2013 resolution became final and executory as of May 4, 2013 upon the lapse of five days from its promulgation without a restraining order being issued by the Supreme Court. 

Categories
Jurisprudence Political Law

Hard Law vs. Soft Law in International Law

Distinguish Hard Law and Soft Law in International Law

Hard Law

Means binding laws; to constitute law, a rule, instrument or decision must be authoritative and prescriptive. In international law, hard law includes treaties or international agreements, as well as customary laws. These instruments result in legally enforceable commitments for countries (states) and other international subjects. 

Soft Law

These are non-binding rules of international law. Soft law is of relevance and importance to the development of international law because it: (1) has the potential of law-making, i.e. it may be a starting point for later ‘hardening’ of non-binding provisions (e.g. UNGA resolutions may be translated into binding treaties); (2) may provide evidence of an existing customary rule; (3) may be formative of the opinio juris or of State practice that creates a new customary rule; (4) may be helpful as a means of a purposive interpretation of international law; (5) may be incorporated within binding treaties but in provisions which the parties do not intend to be binding; and (6) may in other ways assist in the development and application of general international law.

The importance of soft law is emphasized by the fact that not only States but also non-State actors participate in the international law-making process through the creation of soft law. Nevertheless, soft law is made up of rules lacking binding force, and the general view is that it should not be considered as an independent, formal source of international law despite the fact that it may produce significant legal effects. 

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Case Digest

CASE DIGEST: THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015

THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015, LEONEN, J. 

FACTS

Bishop Vicente M. Navarra posted two (2) tarpaulins, each with approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in size, for public viewing within the vicinity of San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. One of the tarpaulins stated: “Conscience Vote” and lists of candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark.The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of the RH Law. 

Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted against it form “Team Buhay. 

When the said tarpaulin came to the attention of Comelec, it sent a letter to Bishop Navarra ordering the immediate removal of the tarpaulin because it was in violation of Comelec Resolution No. 9615 as the lawful size for election propaganda material is only two feet (2’) by three feet (3’); otherwise, it will be constrained to file an election offense against the latter. 

Concerned about the imminent threat of prosecution for their exercise of free speech, Bishop Navarra, et al. prayed for the Court to declare the questioned orders of Comelec as unconstitutional, and permanently restraining the latter from enforcing them after notice and hearing. 

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the controversial tarpaulin is an election propaganda which the Comelec has the power to regulate; otherwise its prohibition shall constitute an abridgment of freedom of speech.

RULING: 

It is not election propaganda.

While the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by any candidate, political party, or party-list group. 

Personal opinions, unlike sponsored messages, are not covered by the second paragraph of Sec. 1(4) of Comelec Resolution No. 9615 defining “political advertisement” or “election propaganda.” 

The caricature, though not agreeable to some, is still protected speech. That petitioners chose to categorize them as purveyors of death or of life on the basis of a single issue—and a complex piece of legislation at that—can easily be interpreted as an attempt to stereotype the candidates and party- list organizations. Not all may agree to the way their thoughts were expressed, as in fact there are other Catholic dioceses that chose not to follow the example of petitioners. 

But, the Bill of Rights enumerated in our Constitution is an enumeration of our fundamental liberties. It is not a detailed code that prescribes good conduct. It provides space for all to be guided by their conscience, not only in the act that they do to others but also in judgment of the acts of others.